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Abstract—Linear Consistency Test (LCT) is a widely used
algebraic attack against pseudorandom generator schemes. A
system of linear equations depending on a guessed part of
the key is assigned to the analyzed generator and checked for
consistency. If the guessed part of the key is not the right one, the
system will be inconsistent with high probability. In the presence
of noise, additional measures are necessary for this attack to
be successful. They must reduce the influence of intercepted
output bits complemented by noise. In this paper, a technique is
described that tries to guess which bit(s) of the intercepted output
sequence are complemented by noise and remove all the equations
from the linear system assigned to the generator that depend
on those bits. The technique is demonstrated on cryptanalysis
of a Binary Rate Multiplier (BRM). The experiments on this
generator show that such an attack is feasible if the noise level
is up to moderate.
Index Terms—Cryptanalysis, Irregular Clocking, Linear Con-
sistency Test (LCT), Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
I. INTRODUCTION
Linear Consistency test (LCT) is an algebraic attack against
a pseudorandom generator scheme that tries to recover its
whole initial state starting from some guessed bits of it. A
linear system in the unknown bits of the key is set up, in which
the right-hand side of every equation is an intercepted bit of
the output sequence of the generator, and its consistency is
checked. If the guessed part of the key is not the right one, such
a system will be inconsistent with high probability, see [7].
The attack proceeds as follows: first, a subset of the key bits
is guessed. Then, a system of equations, in which the rest of
the key bits are variables is set up. If the guessed key bit subset
is not the right one, the consistency probability of the obtained
system will be very small. The consistency of the system is
tested for all the possible choices of the guessed portion of
the key. If the length of the intercepted output sequence of the
generator is sufficient (see [7]), the right choice of the guessed
part of the key will lead to a consistent system, whose solution
will be the rest of the key.
If we consider a ciphertext-only attack scenario, in which
some of the intercepted output bits of the generator are
degraded (i.e. complemented) by noise, we have to com-
pensate the influence of the complemented intercepted bits
on the consistency of the system in order for the attack to
be successful. In this paper, we first guess which of the
intercepted bits are complemented by noise and then we
remove from the system assigned to the generator all the
equations involving the guessed complemented bits. Suppose
that the length of the intercepted output sequence is sufficient
for making decisions about consistency of the system assigned
to the analyzed generator. If the choice of the guessed portion
of the key is right, and the guess of the positions of the
intercepted bits affected by noise is right, the remaining system
will be consistent. If the guessed portion of the key is the
right one but the choice of the positions of the intercepted
output bits degraded by noise is wrong, the resulting system
might be consistent (the probability for this is significant).
But if the guess of the key portion is wrong, the system will
remain inconsistent with high probability even if the guess of
the positions of the bits of the intercepted output sequence
degraded by noise is right.
We apply the attack described in the previous paragraph on
a representative of a special class of pseudorandom sequence
generators, so-called irregular clocking generators. Specifi-
cally, we analyze how the new LCT attack can be applied
on a noised Binary Rate Multiplier (BRM) [2], but the same
ideas can be applied in attacks against other representatives
of the class as well - the Stop/Go generator, the Shrinking
generator, the Alternative Step generator and so on.
The attacks against BRM have been studied by many
authors, since that scheme is widely used in practice due to the
desirable properties of the output sequence achievable with it
(extremely long period and linear complexity, good statistical
properties etc.) Most attacks against BRM are correlation
attacks (for example [3], [4], etc.) The LCT attack against
BRM has also been attempted [5], but in a known-plaintext
attack scenario, i.e. without noise. The possibility of an LCT
attack against noised BRM was studied in [1] and [6]. This
attack tries to avoid influence of the bits of the intercepted
sequence affected by noise by changing the starting point in
the intercepted sequence from which the setting up of the
system of equations starts. The attack might be successful if
the noise level (i.e. the probability of ’1’ in the noise sequence)
is small, but false alarms and missing the event regarding the
right guess of the part of the key are inevitable and because of
that a more precise localisation of the bits affected by noise
is needed.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section II, the
BRM-based pseudorandom sequence generator is described.
In Section III, the detailed description of the new attack is
given. In Section IV, the experimental results are presented
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and discussed. Section V concludes the paper.
II. THE ANALYZED GENERATOR
We analyze the LCT attack on a noised pseudorandom
sequence generator involving a primitive known as The Binary
Rate Multiplier (BRM). BRM consists of 2 linear feedback
shift registers (LFSRs). One of them, the clocking LFSR
(LFSRs), determines the clocking sequence for the clocked






Fig. 1. The BRM primitive
The BRM operates as follows (Fig. 2): Without clocking by
LFSRs, the register LFSRu produces the binary sequence un.
At the clock pulse i of LFSRs, the bits from k positions of
LFSRs determine the integer si that represents the number of
bits from the sequence un that are going to be discarded. The
integers si, i = 1, 2, . . . make the sequence sn. The process of
discarding bits in this way is called non-uniform decimation
of the sequence un. The maximum value of the integer si
determines the maximum number of bits from the sequence
un that can be discarded at a time. The binary sequence zn is








Fig. 2. Operation of the BRM
The BRM primitive has become popular in the design of
stream ciphers since it can be shown [2] that the produced
sequence zn has extremely long period and high linear com-
plexity preserving at the same time good statistical properties
of a single LFSR.
III. THE NEW LCT ATTACK
In this section, we give details of the new LCT-based attack
against a noised BRM. The general description and remarks
about LCT have been exposed in the Introduction. To design
an LCT attack against BRM, we have to determine which
part of the BRM key (which consists of the initial states of
LFSRs and LFSRu, as usual) is to be guessed. It is shown in
[5] that assigning a linear system to a BRM when the initial
state of LFSRs is guessed is easy. Then the unknowns in the
system are the bits of the output sequence of LFSRu without
decimation together with the bits of the initial state of the same
LFSR and the right-hand side of any equation in the system is
the corresponding bit of the intercepted sequence. In our new
LCT attack on a noised BRM, we use the same approach. We
guess the initial state of LFSRs and make a system of linear
equations in the unknowns of the initial state of LFSRu and
the unknown bits of the output sequence of LFSRu without
decimation. The main point of our attack is the algorithm that
eliminates the influence of the bits of the intercepted sequence
complemented by noise.
Example 1
Suppose the BRM from Fig. 1 uses 4-bit LFSRs and the
primitive feedback polynomials of LFSRs and LFSRu are
fs(x) = 1 + x + x
4 and fu(x) = 1 + x3 + x4, respectively.
Let the number of output taps of LFSRs be k = 2 and the
tap positions are the first and the second (from the left).
Let the initial states of LFSRs and LFSRu be 1010 and
0110, respectively. Then the clocking sequence for LFSRu (i.e.
the integer sequence sn) is 31021002333 . . . and the output
sequence of the BRM is 11010110111 . . .
Let the cryptanalyst’s guess of the initial state of LFSRs
be right, i.e. 1010. In the LCT attack against the generator
without noise, the so-called decimation sequence is gen-
erated, containing the symbol ’2’ in the positions of the
unknown bits. Each symbol ’2’ will correspond to a new
variable in the system of equations assigned to the gener-
ator. In this case, the decimation sequence will be 2222 |
22212102212011220222122212221 . . .. The symbol | delimits
the variables of the initial state of the clocked register LFSRu
from the rest of the variables. The variables to the left from
the symbol | are given in the order x4, x3, x2, x1, whereas
the variables to the right from the symbol | are given in the
increased order of indexing, i.e. x5, x6, etc. Then the system
of linear equations assigned to the given BRM is:
x3 + x4 + x5 = 0
x2 + x3 + x6 = 0
x1 + x2 + x7 = 0
x1 + x5 = 1
x5 + x6 + x8 = 0
...
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The new ciphertext-only attack against a BRM is described
below:
1. Guess the initial state of the LFSRs.
2. Set up a system of equations assigned to such a BRM
without involving the intercepted bits. Such a system is
homogeneous and always consistent.
3. Set up a system of equations involving only the equa-
tions containing the intercepted bits.
4. Join the obtained systems and check the consistency of
the joint system. The following cases are possible:
4.1 There is no noise and the right initial state of LFSRs
was guessed - the joint system will be consistent and
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the missing bits of the initial state of LFSRu can be
obtained by solving the system.
4.2 There is no noise and the guess of the initial state of
LFSRs was wrong - the joint system will be inconsis-
tent with high probability, see [7].
4.3 The intercepted sequence was degraded by noise and
the guess of the initial state of LFSRs was right - the
joint system will be inconsistent with high probability
because of the bits of the intercepted sequence com-
plemented by noise.
4.4 The intercepted sequence was degraded by noise and
the guess of the initial state of LFSRs was wrong - the
joint system will be inconsistent with high probability.
5. Suppose that t bits of the intercepted sequence were
degraded by noise. Guess their positions. Remove all the
equations involving these complemented bits from the
joint system. Provided the intercepted sequence is long
enough (see [7]), the following cases are possible:
5.1 The guess of the initial state of LFSRs was right - if
the guess of the positions of the bits of the intercepted
sequence that were complemented by noise was right,
the system will become consistent and solving the sys-
tem will give the missing bits of the key of the BRM. If
the guess of the positions of the bits of the intercepted
sequence complemented by noise was wrong, there will
be relatively high probability (compared with that in
the case of a wrong guess of the initial state of LFSRs)
that the system will become consistent.
5.2 The guess of the initial state of LFSRs was wrong -
the system will not become consistent even if the guess
of the positions of the bits of the intercepted sequence
complemented by noise was right.
6. Repeat the step 5. of the algorithm for all the combi-
nations of guesses for the positions of the t bits com-
plemented by noise in the intercepted sequence, starting
from t = 1, then t = 2 and so on, until a consistent
system is obtained.
The success of the attack described above depends on
the level of noise, i.e. the ratio between the number of bits
complemented by noise in the intercepted sequence and the
length of the intercepted sequence. A relatively small level
of noise ensures relatively small number of combinations for
the guesses of the complemented bits, which makes the attack
feasible. In that case the attack is likely to be successful.
Example 2
Refer to the Example 1 above and suppose that the first
bit of the intercepted output sequence from the generator is
complemented by the noise sequence. This affects the equation
x1+x5 = 1 from Example 1 and other equations involving the
complemented bit (2 more equations, since the weight of the
feedback polynomial of LFSRu is 2). The system of linear
equations assigned to the given BRM becomes inconsistent
(with high probability). To mitigate this, we have to remove
the equations from the system that involve the complemented
bits (in our example, the number of complemented bits in the
intercepted sequence is t = 1). We guess the position of the
complemented bit. Suppose our guess is right, i.e. the first bit
in the intercepted sequence is complemented by noise. If we
remove all the equations involving that bit from the system, it
will become consistent again, since, as we said in Example 1,
our guess of the initial state of LFSRs was right. By solving
the system, we get the initial state of LFSRu. If the guess of the
position of the complemented bit in the intercepted sequence
is wrong, there is some probability that the system remains
consistent if the guess of the initial state of LFSRs was right.
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Regarding the time complexity of the attack, we should note
that it is necessary to check all the possible initial states of
LFSRs in the attack, which gives the time complexity of the
attack of O(c · 2Ls), where Ls is the length of LFSRs and c
is the number of combinations for complementing the bits of
the intercepted sequence. c is small for low levels of noise,
which makes the attack feasible in those cases.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
The experimental setup involved LFSRs and LFSRu, both
of length 4, with primitive feedback polynomials (fs(x) =
1 + x + x4 and fu(x) = 1 + x3 + x4). 2 positions of the
register LFSRs determined the clocking of LFSRu, i.e. k = 2,
which means that up to 3 bits of the output sequence of LFSRu
without decimation could be discarded at a time. The length
of the intercepted output sequence was 20 and up to 2 bits
of the output sequence of the BRM could be complemented
by the noise, i.e. p(1) ≤ 10% in the noise sequence. The
experiment consisted of the following: for a fixed number of
bits of the intercepted sequence complemented by noise t,
t = 1, 2, all the possible combinations of positions of bits
complemented by noise were tried. For each such combination,
after complementing the intercepted sequence bits accordingly,
the new LCT attack was run and the number of cases in
which the guess of the initial state of LFSRs was right and
the consistent system was obtained was recorded. The number
of cases in which the guess of the initial state of LFSRs was
wrong and a consistent system was obtained (false alarms) was
also recorded. The cases where the number of false alarms
was greater than the number of correct guesses followed by
consistent systems were of particular interest, since in such
a case the solution of the cryptanalytic problem given by our
algorithm would be wrong. The goal of the experimental work
was to investigate how the number of such cases behaves when
t increases. In addition to the number of false alarms, the
number of initial states of LFSRs that the LCT-based attack
algorithm would label as solution states would be important
to study since in the case of a false alarm, the cryptanalyst
would have to check those states further in order to eliminate
the wrong solutions. We should bear in mind that the right
solution is always offered by the attack algorithm, even when
we get false alarms. The experimental results are given in
Table I. In that table, for t = 1 and t = 2, the numbers of false
alarms nf are listed. In addition, the maximum numbers of
solutions (i.e. the initial states of LFSRs offered by the attack
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TABLE I
THE NUMBERS OF FALSE ALARMS OBTAINED WITH THE NEW LCT
ATTACK (SEE TEXT)
N nf nf% ns fs fs%
t = 1 20 1 5 2 1 5
t = 2 190 62 33 5 2 1
algorithm) ns are given together with the numbers of cases fs,
in which the false alarms were generated with the maximum
number of solutions (that would be the worst possible case for
the cryptanalyst). In the table, N represents the total number
of possible combinations for complementing the bits of the
intercepted sequence.
From the Table I it can be noted that for t = 2 the
number of false alarm cases is quite high, approx. 33% of
all the cases. The maximum number of solution initial states
of LFSRs offered by the attack algorithm in that case is
ns = 5, which is 1/3 of the possible number of initial
states of that register. This number is also quite high, but to
recover from such a situation, ordering of these solution states
according to the corresponding numbers of consistent systems
obtained in the attack is possible to perform, which in most
cases places the right initial state to the second position. This
eliminates the problem of too many solutions offered by the
attack algorithm and also makes the problem of too many
false alarms easier. The greatest advantage of the new attack
compared with the attack from [1] and [6] is in the fact that
the new algorithm always produces the right solution, even
when it is accompanied by a false alarm.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new Linear Consistency Test (LCT)-based
attack against a noised pseudorandom generator scheme em-
ploying irregular clocking is described and analyzed. The
attack was applied against a specific representative of this class
of generators known as The Binary Rate Multiplier (BRM).
The attack first assigns a system of linear equations to the
BRM based on a guessed initial state of its clocking LFSR.
This system is then checked for consistency and if consistent,
the right initial state of the clocking LFSR was guessed. If
the obtained system is inconsistent, the equations involving
complemented bits of the intercepted sequence are eliminated
from the system and then the consistency of the system is
checked again. Which bits of the intercepted sequence are
complemented is also guessed. If the guess of those bits
is right, the obtained system will surely become consistent.
Otherwise, if the guess of the initial state of the clocking
LFSR was right, there is a significant chance that the newly
obtained system becomes consistent. In a contrary case, the
new system will be inconsistent with high probability. The
attack always gives the right solution for the initial state of
the clocking LFSR, but that solution may be accompanied
by other solutions (false alarms). The recovery procedure in
those cases is proposed as well. The attack is feasible if the
number of possible combinations for the bits of the intercepted
sequence complemented by noise is small, which means that
the level of noise is up to moderate.
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